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Abstract 
This paper investigates exchange rate volatility in an international oligopolistic market in 
a foreign country that accepts affiliate firms through foreign direct investment. The 
affiliate firms must procure intermediate products from their overseas parent firms. We 
derive a Cournot equilibrium of a market in which affiliate firms compete with local firms 
under foreign exchange rate uncertainty. In equilibrium, we show that affiliates 
aggressively expand output and the ex-post expected profits and ex-ante certainty 
equivalence of the affiliates’ profits increase / decrease with a rise in exchange rate risk 
when the relative risk aversion coefficient is small / large. 
 
Keywords: risk aversion, exchange rate volatility, short-run equilibria, and international 
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1. Introduction 
The bubble of the Japanese economy burst in the early 1990s; since then, the country 
has faced a rapidly aging population and declining birth rate. Consequently, as the 
domestic markets for various products and services have shrunk in Japan, Japanese 
manufacturers have sought to expand exports to compensate for reduced domestic sales. 
Globalization, however, has progressed tremendously since the early 1990s. To compete 
with the low costs of rival overseas manufacturers, Japanese manufacturers have pursued 
foreign direct investments (FDI).  
As Lahiri and Ono (2004) indicate, "many Japanese firms make foreign direct 
investments in China as labour costs there are much lower than those in Japan, ...in such 
cases the commodities produced in the host country are exported in their entirely to a 
third country (consuming country)."  
In a 2018 regional analysis report, however, JETRO (Japan External Trade 
Organization) states that ASEAN member countries have become increasingly appealing 
both as bases of production and consumer markets for Japanese firms, and the direct 
investments made by Japanese firms have made a great deal of progress on both fronts.１ 
In addition, another recent regional analysis report by JETRO notes that annual direct 
investment by Japanese firms in China has increased, reaching about 135 billion US 
dollars, and 60% of Japanese firms plan to expand business into China within the next 
two years to enhance their sales in the Chinese market. 
Japanese manufacturers that make FDI must export intermediate production inputs to 
their overseas affiliates. They also remit a portion of their profits from their affiliates back 
 
１See the regional analysis report by JETRO in 2018 (Fujie, 2018), for more information. 
to Japan. As such, they face exchange rate uncertainty. Japanese firms must choose their 
outputs in overseas markets based on an ex-ante expectation of the exchange rate.  
For parent manufacturers with a shrinking domestic market, it is important to earn an 
allotment of their affiliate’s profits in the foreign country. To facilitate this, many 
governments offer manufacturers either partial or total tax exemption for remittances or 
dividends from overseas affiliates２ . Currently, Japan is one of the biggest creditor 
countries in the world. Therefore, it has become increasingly important for the Japanese 
government to induce affiliates in foreign countries to remit dividends or profits to their 
multinational parent firms. Hasegawa and Kiyota (2017) positively explore the effect of 
the dividend exemption system on profit repatriation by Japanese multinational firms. 
They explore the effect of the recent transition by the Japanese government from a 
worldwide income tax system to a territorial tax system (with dividend exemption) on 
profit repatriation by Japanese multinational firms. By using unique confidential survey 
data from Japanese multinational corporations, they find that the response of Japanese 
multinationals to the dividend exemption has been heterogeneous. Thus, they find that 
foreign affiliates with a large stock of retained earnings in the previous year or before the 
tax reform were more responsive to the tax reform and significantly increased dividend 
payments to their parent firms. They also find that dividend payments by the affiliates 
also became more responsive to withholding tax rates on dividends levied by the 
government of the host country after the tax reform.  
However, the trade war between the United States and China has continued. Both 
governments have been engaging in tit-for-tat responses to each other by levying tariffs 
 
２Indeed, the Japanese government introduced a Foreign Dividend Exclusion system in 2009 that exempts dividends 
remitted by Japanese-owned foreign affiliates to their parent firms from home-country taxation. 
on imports from the opponent country. In addition, there is a so-called “Brexit” problem; 
the possibility of the UK leaving the EU without a deal has risen with the birth of the 
Boris Jonson cabinet in the UK. If this happens, the economy of the UK may be damaged. 
Consequently, the businesses and economies of the world may suffer losses, and foreign 
exchange markets will be confused and become uncertain. Even in such an environment, 
parent firms need to compete through their affiliates in foreign oligopolistic markets. In 
such a case, the extent of relative risk aversion to exchange rate volatility by the parent 
firm has a crucial impact on the production strategy of its affiliate firm, which procures 
parts or intermediate goods from its parent firm and remits a portion of its profits to the 
parent firm. 
Lahiri and Ono (2004) analyze trade and industrial policies, including FDI; local 
content requirements (LCR); and the effect of these government policies on the economic 
welfare of the market equilibria in a multi-country trade theoretic framework in the 
presence of Cournot oligopolistic interdependence in production under oligopoly. 
However, they do not consider the exchange rate uncertainty of the present floating 
exchange rate system, which affects the behaviors of firms and trade as a result of the 
competition among global markets.  
In the literature, there are many studies that investigate the effect of exchange rate 
volatility on FDI decisions by multinational firms and the resultant market outcomes. For 
example, Owen and Perrakis (1988) consider Cournot duopoly competition in a foreign 
market composed of an international firm that supplies a good under perfect competition 
in its domestic market and also supplies the same good in a foreign market. They also 
consider a foreign firm that supplies the same good as the international firm does in a 
foreign duopolistic market. They create a two-stage model. In the first stage, ex-ante, both 
firms simultaneously choose their own outputs (the total output the international firm 
supplies to domestic and foreign markets and the output of the foreign firm for the foreign 
market) to maximize the expected their own profits before the exact value of the exchange 
rate random variable has been observed. In the second stage, the exchange rate variable 
is realized, and only the international firm allocates ex-post the given total output—
chosen in the first stage—between the domestic and foreign markets as a function of the 
observed value of the exchange rate. They solve the problem backward; they solve the 
second stage of the game and then the first by incorporating the outcome of the second 
stage and the expectation with respect to the exchange rate ex-post. However, they do not 
cope with FDI explicitly or oligopoly competition; they assume that both firms are risk 
neutral and do not consider the effect of the extent of risk aversion by the firms on the 
equilibrium outcome.  
Sung and Lapan (2000) investigate, in their seminal work, how exchange-rate 
uncertainty affects the foreign investment decision of a risk-neutral multinational firm 
(MNF) in a monopoly setting. They show that the MNF would open only one plant in its 
home country or a foreign country, under the assumption that the firm can open plants, 
each with decreasing average costs, in two different countries. However, under 
uncertainty (under a mean-preserving spread exchange rate distribution or uniform 
exchange rate distribution), they demonstrate that under sufficiently large exchange rate 
volatility, the firm can increase its expected profit by opening several plants. They also 
show that if the MNF faces a competitor in a foreign market, then the exchange rate risk 
induces the MNF to open plants in both markets, consequently preventing entry by the 
local competitor.  
Lahiri and Mesa (2006) explore the effects of exchange rate volatility in both the host 
country and the parent country on host-government policy related to the local content 
requirement (LCR) on export-oriented foreign direct investment (FDI) in the context of 
an oligopolistic market in a third country using a Brander and Spencer (1987) type trade 
model. Namely, they assume that there are identical domestic risk-neutral firms and 
identical foreign risk-averse firms in the domestic (host) country, and they compete in a 
Cournot oligopolistic market for a homogeneous good in a consuming third country, 
where there are no producers for the good. Hence, they do not examine how a change in 
the volatility of exchange rates affects the behavior of affiliate and host-country firms that 
compete with one another and their resulting equilibrium outcomes in the host country 
oligopolistic market. 
Under the assumption that the exchange rates follow log-normal distributions, Lahiri 
and Mesa (2006) show that an increase in the volatility of foreign exchange rates 
decreases optimal LCR levels both under free entry and exit for the foreign firm and when 
the number of foreign firms is fixed. They also find that the government uses a less strict 
LCR policy when the number of foreign firms is endogenous than when it is exogenous.  
There are few studies that consider the effect of exchange rate risk on international 
oligopolistic competition among FDI affiliate firms in a foreign market in which affiliates 
procure important intermediate goods or parts from parent companies and repatriate part 
of their profit. Therefore, in this paper, we consider an international oligopoly model with 
an oligopolistic market in a foreign country. The international firms compete with local 
firms in a host country’s oligopolistic market through FDI in affiliate firms.  
Particularly, we explore how the volatility of exchange rate risk affects the behaviors 
of affiliate and foreign firms, depending on their level of risk aversion, in a foreign 
oligopolistic market. We investigate both effects in the absence of free entry and exit by 
affiliate firms.  
We assume that the affiliates procure all intermediate goods or parts to produce their 
final goods from their parent firm in the home country. We suppose that they also have 
to repatriate a portion of the profits earned in the foreign market. We do not consider any 
policies by the government, such as LCR, tariffs, or production subsidies for domestic 
firms in the host country, that may affect the economic welfare of the equilibrium 
outcome.  
We consider a Cournot oligopolistic market game in a host country that accepts n 
affiliate firms through FDI from the home country. First, we derive equilibria in the case 
in which the number of affiliates, 𝑛, is exogenously given under the assumption that the 
exchange rates follow log-normal distributions, as Lahiri and Mesa (2006) assume. We 
investigate how the changes in exchange rate volatility on the international oligopolistic 
market affect equilibria outcomes.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our model and 
we derive an equilibrium in the absence of the free entry and exit of affiliate firms. We 
also examine the properties of the equilibrium outcomes in the equilibria. In section 3, 
we explore how a change in the volatility of the exchange rate affects the equilibrium 
outcomes in the absence of free entry and exit by affiliate firms. Finally, section 5 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. Model 
Here, we consider an international oligopoly model with the oligopolistic market in a 
foreign country. The international home firms (IH firms hereafter) compete in a foreign 
host country (country 2) oligopolistic market through their affiliate firms (A firms 
hereafter) using foreign direct investment (FDI). Furthermore, we assume A firm 𝑖 
internally reserves its profit from the foreign market equilibrium at the retained earnings 
rate of 𝑠 (0 < 𝑠 < 1) and remits its profit at the repatriation rate of 1 − 𝑠 from the 
foreign market to the head office of its IH firm in the home country. We thus derive a 
Cournot equilibrium under foreign exchange rate uncertainty when the number of IH 
firms, 𝑛, is either exogenous or endogenous. Then, we explore the effects of foreign 
exchange rate volatility on equilibrium outcomes.  
Assume there are two countries: country 1 (home country) and 2 (foreign country). In 
country 2’s oligopoly, 𝑛 international firms from country 1 compete in an oligopolistic 
market in country 2 through their affiliate companies (A firms) with 𝑚 foreign firms (F 
firms).  
Each IH firm in country 1 has a constant return to scale technology by 𝑐௜ு, 𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑛, 
indicated by the home currency.  
We assume that an international firm supplies its product to both a domestic market 
and foreign market. Although each IH firm procures its parts or intermediate goods from 
the home country for products on its domestic market, their affiliate firms in country 2 
import all parts or intermediate goods from country 1. Each foreign firm supplies its 
product domestically and procures all parts or intermediate goods from country 2. We 
only focus on the market competition in country 2 between A and F firms, since A firms 
choose the outputs they supply to the market in the home country independently of the 
outputs sold to the foreign market. 
Figure 1 depicts the competition among A and F firms in an oligopolistic foreign 
market under exchange rate uncertainty. It also shows the relationship between each 
parent firm in the home country and its affiliate firm.  
[Insert here Figure 1]  
Foreign firms have constant returns to scale technology, and their marginal and average 
common cost is given by 𝑐ி ≡ 𝑐௝ி, 𝑗 = 1, ⋯ 𝑚, as indicated by the foreign currency.  
Each A firm in country 2 incurs marginal cost ?̃?஺ to produce its product, which is a 
random variable because it depends on the exchange rate between the home and host 
countries’ currencies 𝜖̃. It is based on the belief of the parent firm, IH, or its affiliate firm, 
A, so it is exogenous to the model. 𝜖̃ is assumed to be a log-normally distributed random 
variable; that is, 𝜖̃ = exp ( 𝑋෨), 𝑋෨ ∼ 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎ଶ). We also assume that ln 2 ≈ 0.693 15 >
𝜎ଶ > 0.0095.４ We assume that country 2’s government never imposes a tariff on inputs 
imported from country 1.  
 ?̃?஺ = 𝑐ு/𝜖̃ (1)
Then, it is well known that the mean and variance of 𝜖̃ are given by  
 𝜇ఢ෤ = exp ( 𝜇 + 𝜎ଶ/2) (2)
and  
 
𝜎ఢ෤ଶ = 𝜇ఢ෤ଶ(𝑒ఙమ − 1) ≈ 9. 545 3 × 10ିଷ × 𝜇ఢ෤ଶ < 𝜇ఢ෤ଶ for ln 2
≈ 0.693 15 > 𝜎ଶ > 0.0095. 
(3)
We assume that the mean of exchange rate 𝜖̃,５  
 
４We estimate 𝜇 and 𝜎ଶ from the exchange rate of the Japanese Yen per unit of a foreign currency (i.e., the 
Chinese yuan, Indian rupee, Thai baht, Malaysian ringgit, or Korean 100 won), as 𝜖̃ = exp ( 𝑋෨), 𝑋෨ ∼ 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎ଶ) using 
the Monthly Foreign Exchange Quotation Data published by the Mizuho Bank Corporation in Japan. All of the 
estimated sample variances, 𝜎ଶ෢, of these currencies are included in open interval (0.01,0.03). Namely, under our 
assumption that 𝜖̃ is log-normally distributed, we can estimate that the variance of ln 𝜖̃ is very small. Hence, we 
assume that 0.0095 < 𝜎ଶ < ln 2 to satisfy the assumption 𝒂ఢ > 0. Thereafter, we add an essential parameter, 𝒂ఢ. 
The Monthly Foreign Exchange Quotation Data published by the Mizuho Bank Corporation in Japan is available on 
its website: https://www.mizuhobank.co.jp/market/csv/m_quote.csv. 
５We estimate 𝜇ఢෞ, using the same data as the estimations for 𝜇 and 𝜎ଶ. All of the estimated sample means of 
exchange rate 𝜇ఢෞ for these currencies are included in open interval (2,29). Therefore, we out the assumption.  
 𝜇ఢ෤ > 2. (4)
We can easily derive  
 𝐸ఢ෤ [1/𝜖̃] = exp ( − 𝜇 + 𝜎ଶ/2) =
𝜇ఢ෤
𝑒ଶఓ, (5)
 
 𝑄ிெ ≡௜ୀଵ௡ 𝑞௜஺+௝ୀ௡ାଵ௡ା௠ 𝑞௝ி = 𝑄஺ + 𝑄ி, (6)
 
 𝑝ி = 𝑎ி − 𝑄ிெ = 𝑎ி−௜ୀଵ௡ 𝑞௜஺−௝ୀଵ௠ 𝑞௝ி. (7)
As mentioned in the introduction, the A firm remits a (1 − 𝑠) portion of its profit to 
the head office in home country 1. Therefore, the head office is interested in the amount 
of the expected remittance from its affiliate. Hence, we can define the amount of 
remittance to the head office of IH firm from its affiliate in foreign country 2 as  
𝜋௜ூு ≡ (1 − 𝑠)𝜖̃(𝑝ி − ?̃?஺)𝑞௜஺ 
= (1 − 𝑠)𝜖̃(𝑎ி−௜ୀଵ௡ 𝑞௜஺−௝ୀଵ௠ 𝑞௝ி − ?̃?஺)𝑞௜஺ 
 = (1 − 𝑠)𝜖̃(𝑎ி − 𝑄஺ − 𝑄ி − 𝑐ு/𝜖̃)𝑞௜஺, 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛. (8)
From (6), (7), and (8), the certainty equivalence of the profit of A firm 𝑖 is given by  
𝐸ఢ෤ [𝐶𝐸𝜋௜ூு] = (1 − 𝑠)𝐸ఢ෤ [𝐶𝐸𝜋௜஺] 
= (1 − 𝑠){𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜖̃(𝑝ி − ?̃?஺)𝑞௜஺] − 𝛾𝑆𝐷ఢ෤ [𝜖̃(𝑝ி − ?̃?஺)𝑞௜஺]} 
 = (1 − 𝑠)[𝒂ఢ{𝑎ி − 𝑄஺ − 𝑄ி} − (1 − 𝛾)𝑐ு]𝑞௜஺, (9)
where 𝐸(⋅)  and 𝑆𝐷(⋅)  stand for expectation and standard deviation operators, 
respectively, and  
𝒂ఢ = 𝜇ఌ − 𝛾𝜎ఢ, 
where 𝛾 is a relative risk averse coefficient. Throughout this paper, we assume that 0 <
𝛾 < 1.６ We can interpret 𝒂ఢ as the home currency compensation coefficient against the 
exchange rate risk because it devaluates the mean of the exchange rate of one unit of 
foreign currency, as indicated by home currency, by the relative risk averse coefficient of 
the head office of the affiliate firm.  
We assume that  
 𝒂ఢ = 𝜇ఢ෤ − 𝛾𝜎ఢ෤ > 0. (10)
From (3), this assumption is equivalent to  
 0 < 𝛾 < (𝑒ఙమ − 1)ିଵ/ଶ ≡ 𝛾(𝜎ଶ), (11)
because 𝒂ఢ = 𝜇ఢ෤ − 𝛾𝜎ఢ෤ = 𝜇ఢ෤ (1 − 𝛾(𝑒ఙమ − 1)ଵ/ଶ).７  
 
3. Equilibrium Derivation 
In this section, we first derive a Cournot game equilibrium in a foreign market, where 
free entry or exit by affiliate firms in not available due to regulation, such as a foreign 
direct investment control by the host government, and the number of affiliates in the 
foreign market is exogenously given. We also examine properties of the equilibrium 
outcome.  
 
６A representative CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Averse) utility function of wealth, 𝑤, is 𝑢(𝑤) = 𝑤ଵିఊ for 0 <
𝛾 < 1. We can ascertain that 𝑢(𝑤) is a concave increasing fuction in 𝑤 for 0 < 𝛾 < 1, and the RRA (Relative 
Risk Averse) measure is -௨ᇲᇲ(௪)௪௨ᇲ(௪) = 𝛾. If 𝛾 > 1, a representative CRRA utility function of 𝑤 is 𝑢(𝑤) = 𝑤଴ −
𝑤ି(ఊିଵ) for 𝛾 > 1, where 𝑤଴ is initial wealth. We also ascertain that 𝑢(𝑤) is a concave increasing fuction in 
𝑤ି(ఊିଵ) for 𝛾 > 1, and RRA=-௨ᇲᇲ(௪)௪௨ᇲ(௪) = 𝛾. However, an organization or individual with this type of utility function 
is a public utility foundation or a person living on unearned income. Here, we assume that a parent private IH firm 
and its affiliate firm are constant relative risk averse, so it seems natural that they have the former CRRA utility 
function, 𝑢(𝑤) = 𝑤ଵିఊ for 0 < 𝛾 < 1. 
７Note that the upper bound of 𝛾 is obtained by assumption (11), which guarantees 𝒂ఢ > 0 for 0.0095 < 𝜎ଶ <
ln 2. 0 < 𝛾(𝜎ଶ) < 10.  23 because 𝛾(𝜎ଶ) is decreasing in 𝜎ଶ and 𝜎ଶ > 0.0095, as will be shown in section 3. 
However, we assume that 0 < 𝛾 < 1 because the parent IH firm and its affiliate firm have the constant relative risk 
averse utility described in footnote 6. 
Here, A firm 𝑖 chooses 𝑞௜஺ to maximize the certainty equivalence of ex-ante profit 
𝐸ఢ෤ [𝐶𝐸𝜋௜஺]. The first order condition for 𝑞௜஺ of A firm 𝑖 is given by  
 
𝜕𝐸ఢ෤ [𝐶𝐸𝜋௜஺]
𝜕𝑞௜஺
= 𝒂ఢ{𝑎ி − 𝑄஺ − 𝑄ி − 𝑞௜஺ − (1 − 𝛾)𝑐ு}
= 0, 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛. 
(12)
The profit of foreign firm 𝑗 is defined by  
 𝜋௝ி = (𝑝ி − 𝑐ி)𝑞௜ி. (13)
From (6) and (13), the first order condition for 𝑞௝ி of foreign firm 𝑗 is given by  
 𝜕𝜋௝
ி
𝜕𝑞௝ி
= 𝑎ி − 𝑄஺ − 𝑄ி − 𝑐ி − 𝑞௝ி = 0, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑚. (14)
Adding (12) and (14) on 𝑖 and 𝑗, respectively, we obtain  
(1 − 𝑠)𝒂ఢ{𝑛𝑎ி − (𝑛 + 1)𝑄஺ − 𝑛𝑄ி} − (1 − 𝑠)𝑛(1 − 𝛾)𝑐ு = 0 
and  
𝑚𝑎ி − 𝑚𝑄஺ − (𝑚 + 1)𝑄ி − 𝑚𝑐ி = 0. 
Solving the above two equations w.r.t. 𝑄஺ and 𝑄ி, we obtain  
 𝑄∗஺ = 𝑛𝑚 + 𝑛 + 1 {𝑎
ி + 𝑚𝑐ி − (𝑚 + 1)(1 − 𝛾)𝑐ு/𝒂ఢ} (15)
and  
 𝑄∗ி = 𝑚𝑚 + 𝑛 + 1 {𝑎
ி − (𝑛 + 1)𝑐ி + 𝑛(1 − 𝛾)𝑐ு/𝒂ఢ}. (16)
Since 𝑞௜஺  and 𝑞௝ி  are symmetrical in 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛  and 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑚, respectively, 
from (15) and (16), we get  
 
𝑞∗஺ ≡ 𝑞௜∗஺ =
1
𝑚 + 𝑛 + 1 {𝑎
ி + 𝑚𝑐ி − (𝑚 + 1)(1
− 𝛾)𝑐ு/𝒂ఢ} 
(17)
and  
 
𝑞∗ி ≡ 𝑞௝∗ி =
1
𝑚 + 𝑛 + 1 {𝑎
ி − (𝑛 + 1)𝑐ி + 𝑛(1
− 𝛾)𝑐ு/𝒂ఢ}. 
(18)
Substituting (15) and (16) into (6), we obtain equilibrium prices in the foreign market:  
 𝑝∗ி = 1𝑚 + 𝑛 + 1 {𝑎
ி + 𝑚𝑐ி + 𝑛(1 − 𝛾)𝑐ு/𝒂ఢ}. (19)
From (9), (17), and (19), the certainty equivalent of the expected profit of affiliate firm 
𝑖 in the foreign market and IH firm 𝑖 in the home country at equilibrium are given by  
𝐸ఢ෤ [𝐶𝐸𝜋௜∗஺] = 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜀̃(𝑝∗ி − ?̃?஺)𝑞௜∗஺] − 𝛾𝑆𝐷ఢ෤ [𝜀̃(𝑝∗ி − ?̃?஺)𝑞௜∗஺] 
 = 𝒂ఢ(𝑞∗஺)ଶ, (20)
and  
 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝐶𝐸𝜋௜∗ூு] = (1 − 𝑠)𝐸ఢ෤ [𝐶𝐸𝜋௜∗஺], (21)
where 𝒂ఢ = 𝜇ఢ෤ − 𝛾𝜎ఢ෤ , 𝜎ఢ෤  and 𝛾 stand for the standard deviation of 𝜖̃ and the relative 
risk aversion coefficient, respectively.  
The ex-post expected profit of affiliate firm 𝑖 in the foreign market and IH firm 𝑖 in 
the home country market at the short-run equilibrium are  
𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜋௜∗஺] = 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜀̃(𝑝∗ி − ?̃?஺)𝑞௜∗஺] 
= 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜀̃(𝑎ி − 𝑄∗஺ − 𝑄∗ி − 𝑐ு/𝜖̃)𝑞௜∗஺] 
 = [ 𝜇ఢ𝑚 + 𝑛 + 1 (𝑎
ி + 𝑚𝑐ி + 𝑛(1 − 𝛾)𝑐ு/𝒂ఢ) − 𝑐ு] × 𝑞∗஺, (22)
and  
 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜋௜∗ூு] = (1 − 𝑠)𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜋௜∗஺], (23)
The ex-post expected profit of firm 𝑗 in the foreign market at the short-run equilibrium 
is given by  
 𝜋∗ி = (𝑝∗ி − 𝑐ி)𝑞௝∗ி = (𝑞௝∗ி)ଶ. (24)
The proof of the proposition is provided in the appendix.  
 
Proposition 1  
Suppose that 𝑐ு < 𝒂ఢ𝑐ி.８ The equilibrium output of the affiliate firm is greater than 
the equilibrium output of the foreign firm, that is, 𝑞∗஺ > 𝑞∗ி. Suppose that the exchange 
risk is very small; thus, 0 < 𝜎ଶ < ln 2 ≈ 0.693 15. Then, the following relationship 
holds among the equilibrium ex-post expected profit, the equilibrium certainty 
equivalence of the affiliate firm and equilibrium ex-post expected profit of the foreign 
firm: If 0 < 𝛾 < 1 <  𝛾(𝜎ଶ)  or ln 2 ≤ 𝜎ଶ , 0 < 𝛾 < 𝛾(𝜎ଶ) ≤ 1,  and 𝑎ி + 𝑚𝑐ி >
(𝑚 + 𝑛 + 1)(𝛾(𝜎ଶ) − 𝛾)𝑐ு/𝒂ఢ, then 𝜋∗ி < 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝐶𝐸𝜋௜∗஺] < 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜋௜∗஺].  
 
From (17) and (18), we see that the affiliate firm A expands its output more 
aggressively when parent firm IH has a larger value of 𝛾 (the extent of relative risk 
aversion to exchange rate volatility). Thus, (1 − 𝛾)/𝒂ఢ  becomes smaller when the 
exchange risk 𝜎ଶ (𝜎ଶ < ln 2 ≈ 0.693 15) is so small because the numerator (1 − 𝛾) 
decreases faster than the denominator, 𝒂ఢ, of the ratio (1 − 𝛾)/𝒂ఢ as the value of 𝛾 
becomes larger. Then, foreign firm F shrinks its output due to the strategic substitute 
property and the ex-ante certainty equivalence of the profit of affiliate firm A also 
decreases as 𝒂ఢ decreases. However, 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜋௜∗஺], the ex-post expected profit of affiliate 
firm A, and 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜋௜∗ூு], the profit of its parent firm IH, increases from (23). Consequently, 
 
８If this inequality does not hold, then IH firms would not want to buy intermediate inputs from home country 1 
under the exchange rate risk. 
we see that 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜋௜∗஺] > 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝐶𝐸𝜋௜∗஺] > 𝜋∗ி.  
 
4. Effect of Change in Exchange Rate Risk on Equilibrium 
Outcomes 
In the following, we explore how a change in the volatility of the exchange rate affects 
the equilibrium outcome.  
We posit a lemma before the presenting results. From (2) and (3), we have  
డఓച෤
డఙమ = exp ( 𝜇 + 𝜎ଶ/2)/2 = 𝜇ఢ෤ /2 > 0  
డఙച෤మ
డఙమ = 𝑒ఙ
మ exp ( 2𝜇 + 𝜎ଶ) + (𝑒ఙమ − 1) exp ( 2𝜇 + 𝜎ଶ) = (2𝑒ఙమ − 1) exp ( 2𝜇 + 𝜎ଶ) >
0.  
Hence, when 𝜖̃ is a log-normally distributed random variable, that is, 𝜖̃ = exp ( 𝑋෨), 
𝑋෨ ∼ 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎ଶ), we see that డఓച෤డఙమ > 0, 
డఙച෤మ
డఙమ > 0. That is, an increase in the exchange rate 
risk increases the mean and variance of the exchange rate. 
We also have  
డ𝒂ച
డఙమ = 𝜇ఢ෤ (1 − 𝛾(2𝑒ఙ
మ − 1)(𝑒ఙమ − 1)ିଵ/ଶ)/2 ⋛ 0 ⟺ 𝛾 (𝑒ఙమ − 1)ଵ/ଶ/(2𝑒ఙమ − 1) ≡
𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ).  
From (10), we can easily derive the next lemma without proof.  
Lemma 1 For any 0.0095 < 𝜎ଶ < ln 2, if 𝛾(0.0095) = (exp ( 0.0095) − 1)ିଵ/ଶ ≈
10.  23 > 𝛾 ≥ 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ), then డడఙమ 𝒂ఢ ≤ 0. If 0 < 𝛾 < 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ), then 
డ
డఙమ 𝒂ఢ > 0.  
From Lemma 1, an increase in exchange rate risk increases (decreases) the home 
currency compensation coefficient against exchange rate risk 𝒂ఢ when the relative risk 
averse coefficient, 𝛾, is small (large).  
We denote, by 𝛾(𝜎ଶ) ≡ (𝑒ఙమ − 1)ିଵ/ଶ , the upper bound of 𝛾 , given by the 
assumption (11). We can easily show that 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 1 < 𝛾(𝜎ଶ) ≡ (𝑒ఙమ − 1)ିଵ/ଶ  < 
𝛾(0.0095) ≈ 10.23 for any 𝜎ଶ such that ln 2 > 𝜎ଶ > 0.0095. The last inequality is 
from (11).  
Thus, we see that  
𝜕
𝜕𝜎ଶ 𝛾
∗(𝜎ଶ) = 𝑒
ఙమ(3 − 2𝑒ఙమ)
2(2𝑒ఙమ − 1)ଶ(𝑒ఙమ − 1)ଵ/ଶ ⋛ 0 ⇔ 
 𝜎 ln 3 − ln 2 = 0.405 47 for  ln 2 > 𝜎ଶ > 0.0095, 
and  
𝜕
𝜕𝜎ଶ 𝛾(𝜎
ଶ) = 𝜕𝜕𝜎ଶ ((𝑒
ఙమ − 1)ିଵ/ଶ) = − 12
𝑒ఙమ
൫𝑒ఙమ − 1൯
ଷ
ଶ
< 0, 
for  ln 2 > 𝜎ଶ > 0.0095. 
Therefore, the upper bound of 𝛾, 𝛾(𝜎ଶ), that guarantee 𝒂ఢ > 0 does not affect the 
optimal choice of output 𝑞∗஺. Only 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) affects it because we assume that 0 < 𝛾 <
1.  
Now, we present the next lemma.  
Lemma 2 The upper bound of 𝛾 given by assumption (11), 𝛾(𝜎ଶ), is decreasing in 
exchange risk 𝜎ଶ, but the threshold for the direction of the change of the home currency 
compensation coefficient against exchange rate risk 𝒂ఢ  in Lemma 1, 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) , is 
inceasing / decreasing in exchange risk 𝜎ଶ , when 0.0095 < 𝜎ଶ < ln 3 − ln 2 ≈
0.405 47 / ln 3 − ln 2 < 𝜎ଶ < ln 2.  
Figure 2 illustrates the properties of 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) and 𝛾(𝜎ଶ) in Lemma 2. Note that the 
difference between 𝛾(𝜎ଶ) and 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) narrows as exchange rate risk 𝜎ଶ increases.  
[Insert here Figure 2]  
A firm with a very small relative risk estimate does not have a high home currency 
compensation coefficient against the exchange risk, but a firm with a large relative risk 
estimate does have a high home currency coefficient when the exchange rate risk becomes 
large enough. Considering the results of the two lemmata together, we can conclude that 
an increase in the exchange risk increases the extent of risk averseness by the firm, which 
shrinks the firm’s estimate of the home currency compensation coefficient against the 
exchange risk.  
By using Lemma 1, we conduct a comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium 
outputs, expected firm profits, and the certain equivalence of profits and price on the 
volatility of exchange rate 𝜎ଶ.  
Next, we conduct a comparative analysis of the equilibrium outcome derived above 
and volatility exchange rate 𝜎ଶ . We begin with a comparative statics analysis of 
exchange rate volatility 𝜎ଶ.  
We present the next proposition. The proof of the proposition is provided in the 
appendix..  
 
Proposition 2  
Suppose that the exchange risk is distributed within a smaller range; thus, 0.0095 <
𝜎ଶ < ln 2 ≈ 0.693 15.  
If the parent IH firm is strongly risk averse (i.e., 0 < 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 𝛾 < 1 ≤ 𝛾(𝜎ଶ)) / 
weakly risk averse (i.e. ,0 < 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 1 < 𝛾(𝜎ଶ)), then the equilibrium output of 
the affiliate A firm (𝑞∗஺) and the total output of affiliate firms (𝑄∗஺) decrease / do not 
decrease as the volatility of the exchange rate (𝜎ଶ) increases.  
If the parent IH firm is strongly risk averse, (i.e., 0 < 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 𝛾 < 1 < 𝛾(𝜎ଶ)) / 
weakly risk averse, (i.e., 0 < 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 1 < 𝛾(𝜎ଶ)), then the equilibrium output of 
the foreign F firm (𝑞∗ி), total output of foreign firms (𝑄∗ி), and equilibrium price in the 
foreign market (𝑝∗ி) increase / do not increase as the volatility of the exchange rate (𝜎ଶ) 
increases.  
 
From the above proposition, when the relative risk aversion coefficient is smaller than 
a threshold, 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ), we see that if the volatility of the exchange rate increases, then each 
A firm aggressively expands its output into the foreign market. Therefore, 𝑄∗஺ increases 
enough so that the equilibrium price decreases if foreign F firms decrease their outputs, 
𝑞∗ி, to mitigate the reduction in price because the number of A firms, 𝑛, is given in this 
case. Hence, 𝑄∗ி decreases because they are strategic substitute in Cournot competition. 
As the increase effect of 𝑄∗஺  surpasses that of the decrease effect of 𝑄∗ி , the total 
equilibrium output, 𝑄∗஺ + 𝑄∗ி, increases and 𝑝∗ி decreases.  
In the following, we examine how the change in the exchange rate risk affects the ex-
post expected profits of firms as well as their certainty equivalence.  
We can present the next proposition. The proof of the proposition is provided in the 
appendix.  
 
Proposition 3  
Suppose that the exchange risk is distributed within a smaller range; thus, 0.0095 <
𝜎ଶ < ln 2 ≈ 0.693 15 . Suppose also that the market share of the foreign firms is 
relatively larger than that of the affiliate firms:  𝑚 + 1 ≥ 𝑛  and 𝑎ி + 𝑚𝑐ு > (𝑚 +
1)(1 − 𝛾)𝑐ு/𝒂ఢ.  
If the relative risk averse coefficient, 𝛾, of the parent IH firm is small (i.e., 0 < 𝛾 ≤
𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 1 < 𝛾(𝜎ଶ)), then the equilibrium ex-post expected profits of the affiliate A firm 
and the parent IH firm, 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜋௜∗஺] and 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜋௜∗ூு], increase as the volatility of the exchange 
rate, 𝜎ଶ, increases. However, if the relative risk averse coefficient, 𝛾, of the parent IH 
firm is large (i.e., ଷ(௠ାଵ)ି௡ଶ(௠ାଵ)ି௡ ⋅ 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 𝛾 < 1), then the equilibrium ex-post expected 
profits of the affiliate A firm and parent IH firm, 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜋௜∗ூு] and 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜋௜∗஺], decrease as the 
volatility of the exchange rate, 𝜎ଶ, increases.  
If the relative risk averse coefficient, 𝛾, of the parent IH firm is small (i.e., 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) <
𝛾 < 1 ) / large (i.e., 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 𝛾 < 1 < 𝛾(𝜎ଶ) ), then the equilibrium certainty 
equivalence of their profits, 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝐶𝐸𝜋௜∗ூு] and 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝐶𝐸𝜋௜∗஺], increase / decrease as the 
volatility of the exchange rate, 𝜎ଶ, increases. If the relative risk averse coefficient, 𝛾, of 
the parent IH firm is large (i.e., 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 𝛾 < 1 < 𝛾(𝜎ଶ) ) / small (i.e., 0 < 𝛾 ≤
𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 1 ≤ 𝛾(𝜎ଶ)), then the equilibrium ex-post expected profit of the foreign F firm, 
𝜋∗ி, increases / does not increases as the volatility of the exchange rate, 𝜎ଶ, increases.  
 
The proposition states that exchange rate volatility 𝜎ଶ affects the equilibrium ex-post 
expected profits, equilibrium certainty equivalence of the affiliate firms’ profits, and 
equilibrium expected profits of foreign firms (when the number of foreign firms is 
relatively more than the affiliate firms, i.e., 𝑚 + 1 ≥ 𝑛). Thus, the total market share of 
the affiliate firms will be smaller than that of the foreign firms.  
Note that the signs for డడఙమ 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜋௜∗ூு] and 
డ
డఙమ 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝜋௜∗஺], and those for 
డ
డఙమ 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝐶𝐸𝜋௜∗ூு] 
and డడఙమ 𝐸ఢ෤ [𝐶𝐸𝜋௜∗஺], are positive / negative when the relative risk averse coefficient, 𝛾, 
of the parent IH firm is small (i.e., 0 < 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 1) / large (i.e. 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 𝛾 < 1 <
𝛾(𝜎ଶ)) in the above proposition in the equilibrium. The ex post expected profit of foreign 
firms decrease / increase when the relative risk averse coefficient, 𝛾, of the parent IH 
firm is small (i.e., 0 < 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 1) / large (i.e. 𝛾∗(𝜎ଶ) < 𝛾 < 1 < 𝛾(𝜎ଶ)) as the 
volatility of the exchange rate, 𝜎ଶ, increases. 
  
5. Conclusion 
We considered an international oligopoly model with an oligopolistic market in a 
foreign country. The international parent firms (IH firms) compete in a foreign host 
country’s oligopolistic market through their affiliates using FDI. Furthermore, we assume 
A firm (affiliate firm) 𝑖 internally reserves its profit at foreign market equilibrium at the 
ratio of 𝑠  (0 < 𝑠 < 1) and remits its profit at the ratio of 1 − 𝑠  from the foreign 
market to the head office of its parent firm IH in the home country. We derived a Cournot 
equilibrium under foreign exchange rate uncertainty for when the number of IH firms, 𝑛, 
is exogenously given. Then, we explored the effects of foreign exchange rate volatility 
on the equilibrium outcome.  
In the equilibrium, we show that if the measure of the relative risk aversion of IH firms 
is small affiliate firms A aggressively expand their outputs, while the foreign F firms 
defensively decrease their outputs and equilibrium price on the foreign market. However, 
if 𝛾  is large, IH firms are severely reluctant to expand due to the increase on the 
exchange rate risk. Further, when the total number of foreign firms is more than that of 
the affiliates firms minus one and the relative risk aversion coefficient is small/large at 
equilibrium, the ex-post expected profits and the ex-ante certainty equivalence of profits 
for the affiliate firms increase/decrease, but the expected profits for the foreign firms 
decrease/increase.  
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Figure 1   Oligopolistic Competition among Affiliate and Foreign firms  
in a Foreign Market 
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